Restore Privacy

Restore Privacy Tunnel (RPT) — a custom-built VPN client for private connectivity. Restore Privacy is built from the ground up using unashamed vibe coding methods and wholly a product of SuperGrok Heavy Grok-Build and Russell G Sneddon's explicit instructions - Regular audits are scripted to run intermittently.

What you get

• Production node: 82.221.101.241:44044 (UDP RPT2), hosted in Iceland on FlokiNET under strict Icelandic privacy norms — as far as we can be assured from the host’s public statements (“No invasive logs”; no third-party tenant traffic/pattern sharing; resource-usage monitoring only — https://flokinet.is/privacy/, https://flokinet.is/vps/)
• Manual Connect / Disconnect with optional seamless power-up via Settings
• Run at device startup (Windows sign-in / Android boot — opt-in)
• Autoconnect on launch (opt-in; defaults off)
• Settings links to the most recent audit, privacy policy, and end user licence
• System tray identity Privacy Restored (Windows) with product logo icons
• Privacy message:

lightweight vpn to restore your privacy - no user data is retained - your privacy is restored

• Full-device VPN when the OS grants VPN permission (Windows UAC / Wintun dual /1, Android VPN consent, Apple Packet Tunnel when signed)
• Residual public IP uses the VPN node only when full-tunnel routes are active (honest status otherwise)
• Close / minimize keeps the tunnel running until Disconnect or Quit
• Disconnect / Quit restores residual routes and product firewall state so the device returns to normal internet (Windows dual /1 teardown + scoped RPT-FW cleanup; Linux TUN/routes teardown)
• Windows Defender Firewall product rules are scoped allows only (node UDP + program) — not unscoped blocks; kill-switch remains opt-in
• Restore Internet failsafe in every catalog installer (network restore + complete product removal) — see warning below
• Public payment portal with seamless flow to downloadable installer package
• No third-party geo lookup on Connect (admission is cryptographic only)
• Connect uses the standard HELLO residual path (flyclient fast-path removed in catalog v0.3.7)
• Node-only optional zram + LUKS2 encrypted RAM volume for host data (node/install_zram_luks.sh) — not client encryption; residual Connect unchanged
• Optional node LUKS2 disk data-at-rest (node/install_disk_encryption.sh) — at-rest only
• Session PFS (ephemeral X25519) on residual HELLO for all product clients (Python Windows/Linux, Android, iOS/macOS Packet Tunnel)
• Layer obfuscation (QUIC-mimic outer wrap around RPT frames) on by default on every residual path (RPT_OBFS=0 to opt out on Python; native product constants default on) — mitigation, not DPI-undetectability
• Product traffic shaping (padding / send jitter / cover) on by default on every residual path — Windows/Linux Python (RPT_TRAFFIC_SHAPE=0 to opt out), Android VPN service, and Apple Packet Tunnel (pad bucket 128, cover ~2s, jitter ≤40ms)
• No product kill switch by default (firewall/iptables block rules and Android setBlocking are off; opt in only with RPT_KILL_SWITCH=1); tunnel DNS only (10.88.0.1, no public DNS fallbacks); IPv4 residual honesty still applies
• Multi-hop residual is opt-in (RPT_MULTIHOP_ENABLED=1): residual Connect dials the exit hop (Romania 185.146.232.107); default remains single-hop Iceland entry — residual-via-exit routing is implemented (not hop-list-only)
• Status site (restoreprivacy.online) shows a live entry-node clear timer (Node A / entry only, ~7d) — exit is never wiped by the weekly service (stays up for residual failover)
• Weekly entry node wipe/rebuild (~7d): exclusive single-instance lock; clients auto residual-failover to exit while entry drains, then prefer re-entry when entry is healthy again (not zero packet-loss; not concurrent exit wipe)
• Security audit documents per-installer AUDIT STATE (Green / Amber / Red) for catalog packages — [AUDIT.md](AUDIT.md)
• Proprietary full copyright end-user licence ([LICENSE](LICENSE)): client packages AS IS, use only to run a device on Restore Privacy VPN; no architecture copy/transmission

How to install and use

Current catalog (v0.3.7): paid installers on https://restoreprivacy.online/ via Stripe (not free permanent GitHub release downloads). Homepage download section shows a large green ONLY £2.45 per month callout under Download client v0.3.7, then the trial/pay box: your monthly subscription begins after your 7 day trial — pay on Stripe, then download starts automatically (licence key and download links are emailed to you separately). Email still delivers keygen + PPI + download link (USE THIS KEYGEN TO UNLOCK YOUR RESTORE PRIVACY TRIAL). Apps: Install → accept licence → enter keygen; Connect only while subscription active. Weekly wipe UI is entry-only (no dual Node A/B wipe countdown on the homepage). The product source repository is private; free permanent GitHub release downloads are not offered. After payment the status site delivers the installer once (authenticated proxy).

> STRONG DISCLAIMER — PAYMENT REQUIRED FOR CONNECT: Access to Connect and residual VPN use requires successful payment. If payment fails at any time (failed checkout, failed charge, refund, dispute, or revoked entitlement), the ability to Connect with the Restore Privacy app is cancelled for that purchase/install until a successful payment is completed.

Unlock Connect after payment: the thank-you page shows your Checkout session id (cs_…) and auto-downloads payment_entitlement.json. In the app open Settings → Payment entitlement, paste the session id, and press Verify payment / unlock Connect (or place payment_entitlement.json in the product data folder). On every Connect the app re-checks the status host so a later refund/failure cancels Connect for that install.

Windows

1. On the status downloads page, pay £2.45 for Windows and download restore-privacy-client-0.3.7-windows-x64-setup.exe (one-time link after payment).
2. Run the installer (PE self-extracting package: frozen runtime + Wintun — no separate Python install). The package may extract as a portable tree or install under LocalAppData.
3. Open Settings → Payment entitlement, paste the Checkout session id from the thank-you page (or import payment_entitlement.json), and Verify payment so Connect is allowed.
4. Press Connect and approve UAC when prompted so residual public IP uses the VPN node. Scoped Windows Defender Firewall allows (node UDP + program) may be applied for residual Connect.
5. Optional: Settings → startup / autoconnect (defaults off); legal links to audit / privacy / licence.
6. Disconnect / Quit tears down dual /1 residual routes so ordinary internet works again. For complete removal, use Restore Internet (see warning below).

Android

1. On the status downloads page, pay £2.45 for Android and download restore-privacy-client-0.3.7-android.apk (one-time link after payment).
2. Install the APK (allow install from unknown sources if your device asks). Catalog APK includes residual wire (PFS + outer obfs).
3. Open Restore Privacy → Settings → Payment entitlement, paste the Checkout session id and Verify payment.
4. Press Connect, and grant VPN permission when prompted.
5. Optional: Settings → startup / autoconnect (defaults off). Minimize keeps the VPN service running until Disconnect.
6. For complete removal, open the in-package Restore Internet guidance and uninstall via system Settings.

Ubuntu and derivatives (Linux Mint, Pop!_OS, …)

Supported floor: Ubuntu 20.04 LTS and later (including 22.04 / 24.04 LTS).

1. On the status downloads page, pay £2.45 for Linux and download restore-privacy-client-0.3.7-linux-x64.tar.gz (one-time link after payment).
2. Unpack and run the bundled installer:

   tar xzf restore-privacy-client-0.3.7-linux-x64.tar.gz
   cd restore-privacy-*-linux   # package folder name from the archive
   bash install.sh

1. Run sudo ./bin/privacy-restored for residual public IP (TUN + dual /1 routes).
2. Failsafe: sudo bash "./Restore Internet" restores normal internet and removes the product (see warning below).

macOS

Published v0.3.7 macOS builds are Developer ID signed and notarized.

1. On the status downloads page, pay £2.45 for macOS and download restore-privacy-client-0.3.7-macos.zip (one-time link after payment).
2. Unzip and open restore_privacy_client.app.
3. Press Connect and approve the VPN configuration prompt.
4. Residual public IP only changes when the Packet Tunnel is active. Host-only HELLO is diagnostic only. Residual public-IP via Packet Tunnel on a developer Mac still needs Team residual re-sign (scripts/sign_macos_residual_team.py) — the public Developer ID zip alone is not full host-NE residual (see client_app/APPLE_HANDOFF_0.3.7.md). Disconnect / Quit stops the system VPN.
5. Failsafe: run Restore Internet.command in the package (or follow VPN Settings cleanup) — see warning below.

iOS

Published v0.3.7 iOS packages are Team-signed sideload zips (not App Store).

1. On the status downloads page, pay £2.45 for iOS and download restore-privacy-client-0.3.7-ios.zip (one-time link after payment).
2. Install Runner.app with device tooling; press Connect and grant VPN permission.
3. Residual public IP only changes when the Packet Tunnel is active.
4. Complete removal: follow Restore Internet.txt (Settings → VPN / Delete App) — see warning below.

VPN APP Shop

https://restoreprivacy.online/

• Pay £2.45 buttons for Windows, Android, macOS, iOS, Linux — catalog v0.3.7
• Installers are delivered after payment (single-use link); the product repo is private
• No public live session / connected-client counter
• A browser tab cannot run full system VPN

Restore Internet (failsafe) — BIG WARNING

Every catalog installer includes a Restore Internet failsafe (Windows/Linux runnable script; macOS .command; iOS/Android guidance). Use it only when you need residual internet restored and complete product removal.

> WARNING: Running Restore Internet will ERASE ALL parts of > Restore Privacy from the device (app, tunnel residual, shortcuts, product > secrets). You may not be able to automatically re-download your > subscription app afterward. Contact russell.gray.sneddon@gmail.com to > obtain a new download link.

Privacy, license, credits, and audit

Core promises: no user-info logs by design, minimal public status (title + downloads + entry-only clear timer for Node A / entry weekly wipe — no exit wipe countdown; exit stays up for residual failover — no live client count), device keys (not a shared client private key), honest residual only when full tunnel is up, no third-party geo on Connect. Product residual paths on all platforms (Windows, Linux, Android, iOS, macOS) enable outer-layer obfuscation and padding / jitter / cover by default; kill-switch is not applied by default. Disconnect / Quit restores residual routes (no intentional blackhole after normal teardown). Restore Internet is a full wipe failsafe (not ordinary Disconnect). Multi-hop residual is opt-in (RPT_MULTIHOP_ENABLED=1): residual dials the Romania exit when multi-hop is active (routing implemented); default remains single-hop Iceland entry. Weekly entry wipe (~7d) with exit residual failover while entry drains. Licence is proprietary full copyright (not MIT for original code). Node tunnel DNS uses DoT upstream. Production node VPS: Iceland / FlokiNET — as far as we can be assured from host public statements, no invasive logs of users connecting to the node (privacy §3.1 / §4).

Threat model

Short user-education summary. Full policy language: [PRIVACY_POLICY.md — Threat model](PRIVACY_POLICY.md). Scenario detail for operators/auditors: [AUDIT.md §4.6](AUDIT.md) (VPS compromise, traffic analysis by ISP, client device seizure).

What it protects against

• Residual public IP uses the VPN node when full tunnel is actually up (honest status otherwise).
• No user-info logs on the product node path; no public live client count.
• Per-device keys (not a shared installer private key).
• Mitigations for coarse traffic fingerprints: outer obfuscation + padding/jitter/cover (default on all product residual DATA paths) — not a claim of DPI-undetectability.
• Tunnel-only DNS (10.88.0.1) while residual capture is active; IPv4 residual honesty when full tunnel is up. Kill-switch firewall blocks are not applied by default (opt-in only: RPT_KILL_SWITCH=1).
• PFS (ephemeral X25519) so long-term key compromise later should not reconstruct past session AEAD keys from the public transcript alone.

What it does not protect against

• Endpoint correlation — sites still know you via logins, cookies, and browser fingerprints; many users share one node egress IP.
• Behavioral analysis — observers can still study when you connect and rough usage patterns.
• VPS / provider IP metadata — product node is FlokiNET in Iceland (strict Icelandic privacy norms); as far as we can be assured from FlokiNET’s public statements the host does not retain invasive connection logs of users connecting to the node. Other providers (CDN/status, home ISP, destinations) may still log. Node OS compromise remains a residual risk.
• Traffic analysis by ISP beyond mitigations — you still appear to use a VPN; opt-in multi-hop residual uses the Romania exit when enabled
• Client device seizure — local keys, apps, and browser history on an unlocked device are out of scope for the node’s no-log promise.
• Malware, compromised OS, or destination-site tracking.

Operators / developers

Node deploy, ports, secrets, from-source builds, and tests: [sundries.txt](sundries.txt).

Device keys: packages do not ship a shared client private key; each install generates its own Ed25519 device key on first run.

Secrets discipline: Never commit or force-add secrets/ (gitignored). Paid release packages must never include node_elgamal.priv or a shared client_ed25519.priv. Release scripts run _assert_no_priv / strip inject gates — keep those on every tag.

Node key protection: RPT_KEY_BACKEND=file|mock|sealed|tpm — sealed/TPM-class stores long-term ElGamal under a wrap key so plaintext .priv is not required on disk. See node/key_backend.py.

Key rotation: python scripts/rotate_node_keys.py --secrets-dir … updates node long-term material + product/node_elgamal.pub pin; clients re-provision public only (reprovision_node_public). Session PFS (X25519) is the product default.

Post-quantum readiness: staged hybrid Kyber/ML-KEM hook in node/pq_hybrid.py + plan [docs/PQ_MIGRATION.md](docs/PQ_MIGRATION.md) (not residual PQ on the wire until dual-wire + real ML-KEM).

Product ship (v0.3.7): Paid installers on status downloads (macOS Developer ID notarized; iOS Team-signed). Source repo is private. Production node 82.221.101.241:44044 (Iceland, FlokiNET VPS; host public no invasive logs stance as far as we can be assured — see privacy policy).

Self-host (one shot): sudo bash scripts/selfhost_node.sh — node install + tunnel DNS + host privacy. Deploy remote: python scripts/deploy_rpt_node.py (RPT_SSH_HOST, RPT_SSH_USER, key). Details: [sundries.txt](sundries.txt).

Tunnel DNS / host privacy: [node/install_dns.sh](node/install_dns.sh), [node/install_host_privacy.sh](node/install_host_privacy.sh).

Data at rest (LUKS / dm-crypt): [node/install_disk_encryption.sh](node/install_disk_encryption.sh) — check / dry-run / confirmed format. Combines with no-logs and [shutdown wipe](node/install_shutdown_wipe.sh) (runtime scrub on stop; optional aggressive secrets wipe). Honesty: FDE protects locked disks only; does not erase provider snapshots.

Ram-only node volume (zram + LUKS2): [node/install_zram_luks.sh](node/install_zram_luks.sh) — check / dry-run / status / confirm-gated format (RPT_ZRAM_LUKS_CONFIRM=yes). Node-host only — clients never install LUKS/zram; residual Connect is unchanged. Honesty: encrypted RAM-backed volume, not full live-root secrecy, not client FDE, not erasure of VPS provider snapshots/netflow.

Weekly entry wipe/rebuild (exclusive; exit failover): [scripts/weekly_entry_rebuild.py](scripts/weekly_entry_rebuild.py) — ~7d timed entry-only snapshot/rebuild (--dry-run by default). Exclusive lock ([node/rebuild_lock.py](node/rebuild_lock.py)) refuses a second concurrent wipe and never wipes exit/both from this service. Pre-wipe gates ([node/wipe_preflight.py](node/wipe_preflight.py)): live path fail-closed unless exit residual and entry node health both pass (UDP response and/or ICMP for exit; local listen/status for entry). After rebuild, mandatory package reinstall via selfhost. Clients auto residual-failover to exit while entry drains, and prefer re-entry when entry is healthy again ([client/multihop.py](client/multihop.py) select_residual_endpoint). Public homepage entry-only clear timer: [status_page/node_wipe_countdown.py](status_page/node_wipe_countdown.py) (exit wipe countdown removed; weekly service never rebuilds exit). Generic plan: [scripts/ephemeral_node.py](scripts/ephemeral_node.py). Timer: [scripts/install_ephemeral_timer.sh](scripts/install_ephemeral_timer.sh). Live requires RPT_EPHEMERAL_CONFIRM=yes. Does not erase provider backups/netflow; re-ship public node pin if keys rotate.

Release scripts: scripts/build_release_0.3.7.py. Windows multihop PE (x64 only): scripts/build_windows_multihop.py / scripts\build_windows_multihop.bat — handoff [client/windows/WINDOWS_HANDOFF_0.3.7.md](client/windows/WINDOWS_HANDOFF_0.3.7.md). Apple handoff: [client_app/APPLE_HANDOFF_0.3.7.md](client_app/APPLE_HANDOFF_0.3.7.md). Release notes: [scripts/RELEASE_NOTES_0.3.7.md](scripts/RELEASE_NOTES_0.3.7.md). Catalog 0.3.7 Windows paid package embeds multihop residual-via-exit (opt-in RPT_MULTIHOP_ENABLED=1).

# Windows GUI (requires system Python)
python -m client.windows

# Windows multihop residual installer (run on Windows x64)
python scripts/build_windows_multihop.py

# Ubuntu / Mint GUI from source (needs system cryptography)
sudo PYTHONPATH=. python3 -m client.linux

# Linux installer package with baked-in crypto wheels (re-run each release)
python scripts/package_linux.py  # manylinux wheels for CPython 3.8–3.12; re-run each release

# Release packages (current tag)
python scripts/build_release_0.3.7.py

Node wipe reinstall (entry ≠ exit): [docs/NODE_WIPE_REINSTALL.md](docs/NODE_WIPE_REINSTALL.md) — weekly timed wipe is entry-only with mandatory full selfhost reinstall; exit is manual/failover.